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BANKRUPTCY
 NO ITEMS. 





 ESTATE TAX LIEN. In a Chief Counsel advice letter the 
IRS discusses the amount of collateral required to secure the 
lien provided by I.R.C. § 6324A for deferred estate taxes. The 
IRS stated that the maximum amount of collateral that can be 
required is the amount equal to the amount of deferred taxes plus 
the	amount	of	interest	payable	over	the	first	four	years.	The	IRS	
stated that the maximum amount of collateral need not always be 
required. Under I.R.C. § 6601(j), when estate taxes are deferred 
under I.R.C. § 6166, a two-part interest rate structure applies. 
Interest	on	the	“2-percent	portion,”	defined	in	I.R.C.	§	6601(j)(2),	
is paid at the rate of 2 percent, with interest on any remaining 
portion paid at the rate equal to 45 percent of the underpayment 
rate established in I.R.C. § 6621. The IRS stated that, if the 45 
percent of the underpayment rate is less than 2 percent, the lower 
interest rate must be used. However, if the 45 percent of the 
underpayment rate is more than 2 percent, the IRS may, but is 
not required to, calculate the interest using the two-part method. 
The next issue of the Digest will publish an article on this ruling 
by Neil E. Harl. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200909044, Dec. 2, 2008.
 GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS. The grantor 
created an irrevocable trust prior to September 25, 1986 which 
gave	 the	 primary	 remainder	 beneficiaries	 a	 general	 power	 of	
appointment over trust property; however, the grantor had 
intended to convey only a special power of appointment. The trust 
sought state court reformation of the trust based on the fact that 
language found elsewhere in the trust agreement was consistent 
with	the	intent	to	provide	only	a	specific	power	of	appointment.	
The court granted the reformation of the trust. The IRS ruled 
that the reformation did not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 
200910003, Nov. 17, 2008.
 The decedent’s will provided for a marital trust and an exempt 
marital	 trust.	On	Schedule	M	of	 the	 Form	706	filed	 for	 the	
decedent’s estate, the executor made the QTIP election with 
respect to the exempt marital trust and marital trust. However, 
Schedule M incorrectly listed the value of the property passing 
to the exempt marital trust.  On Schedule R, the reverse QTIP 
election was made with respect to the exempt marital trust. 
However, the amount passing to the trust was incorrectly listed; 
therefore, on Schedule R, the executor allocated an incorrect 
amount of GST exemption to the exempt marital trust. The IRS 
ruled that the excess GST exemption amount was void and was 
automatically allocated to the marital trust with a zero inclusion 
ratio, provided that allocation amount was equal to the marital 
trust’s federal estate tax amount. The IRS also ruled that the 
reverse QTIP election was limited to the correct amount. Ltr. 
Rul. 200910004, Nov. 14, 2008.
 INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX 
DEFICIENCY. In a Chief Counsel advice letter, the IRS ruled 
that Treas. Reg. § 20.6166-1(c)(1) provides the procedures for 
making	an	election	to	pay	an	estate	tax	deficiency	in	installments	
under I.R.C. § 6166(h), where no election, including a protective 
election, has been made under I.R.C. § 6166(a). The IRS stated 
that neither the statute nor regulations require that the estate tax 
return	must	have	been	timely	filed	in	order	to	make	an	election	to	
pay	that	portion	of	the	deficiency	attributable	to	the	closely	held	
business interest in installments. Therefore, the fact that the estate 
tax	return	was	not	timely	filed	will	not,	in	and	of	itself,	prevent	
an	executor	from	electing	to	pay	a	deficiency	in	installments.	
The IRS ruled that I.R.C. § 6166(h), however, provides that an 
executor	may	not	elect	to	pay	a	deficiency	in	installments	if	the	
deficiency	is	due	to	(1)	negligence,	(2)	intentional	disregard	of	
rules and regulations, or (3) fraud with intent to evade tax. The 
IRS noted that this limitation has been in all the variations of 
I.R.C.	§	6166	since	the	first	version	was	enacted	in	1958.	The	
Committee Report, H.R. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958), 
1959-2	C.B.	709,	713,	indicated	that	if	the	deficiency	was	not	due	
to negligence, intentional disregard of rules and regulations or 
to fraud an election could be made. Thus, the estate may elect to 
pay	the	deficiency	determined	by	the	IRS	in	installments	under	
I.R.C. § 6166(h) even though the estate tax return was not timely 
filed	unless	the	deficiency,	or	any	part	of	the	deficiency,	is	due	
to negligence, to intentional disregard of rules and regulations 
or to fraud. The next issue of the Digest will publish an article 
on this ruling by Neil E. Harl. CCA Ltr. Rul. 20090047, Dec. 
4, 2008.
 SPLIT-DOLLAR LIFE INSURANCE. The taxpayers, 
husband and wife, created an irrevocable trust under which 
the trustee was required to distribute trust income annually 
to	 a	 class	 of	 beneficiaries	 consisting	of	 the	 taxpayer’s	 living	
issue (but excluding their children). Each member of the class 
had a noncumulative power to withdraw their share of any 
contributions to the trust. The trustee also had the discretion to 
distribute trust corpus to a member of the class to provide for 
the	beneficiary’s	health,	education,	support,	and	maintenance.	
If a member of the class dies survived by issue, the surviving 
issue become members of the class. The trust would terminate 
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on the later of the death of the last surviving taxpayer, or when 
the number of class members equals 40. Upon termination, the 
trust corpus will be divided into as many equal shares as there are 
then living children of the taxpayers and deceased children of the 
taxpayers who have left issue then surviving. The terms of the trust 
specifically	precluded	either	taxpayer	from	acting	as	trustee	and	
the taxpayers retained no powers or authority over the trust, trust 
property, or the administration of the trust.  The trust purchased a 
second-to-die life insurance policy on the lives of the taxpayers 
and entered into a split-dollar life insurance agreement with the 
taxpayers. Under the agreement, the trust continued to own the 
policy and pay during the joint lives of the taxpayers an amount 
equal to the insurance company’s current published premium rate for 
annually renewable term insurance generally available for standard 
risks.	After	the	death	of	the	first	taxpayer,	the	trust	would	pay	an	
amount equal to the lesser of: (1) the applicable amount provided 
in Notice 2001-10, 2001-1 C.B. 549, or subsequent IRS guidance; 
or (2) the insurer’s current published premium rate for annually 
renewable term insurance generally available for standard risks. 
The taxpayers would pay the balance of the premiums.  Under 
the agreement, the trust collaterally assigned the following rights 
to the taxpayers: (1) if the agreement terminates on the death of 
the survivor of the taxpayers, then upon the death of the survivor, 
the right of the survivor’s estate to receive the greater of the cash 
surrender value of the policy or the cumulative premiums paid by 
the taxpayers; and (2) if the agreement terminates during the lifetime 
of the taxpayers, or the lifetime of the survivor, then within 60 days 
of termination, the right to receive from the trust an amount equal to 
the greater of the cash surrender value of the policy, or the premiums 
paid by the taxpayers, to the extent the trust has other assets. Under 
the agreement, all incidents of ownership over the policy (including 
the sole right to surrender or cancel the policy, and the sole right to 
borrow or withdraw against the policy) were vested in the trustees 
of trust.  The IRS ruled that the taxpayers were the owners of the 
policy and, so long as the policy premiums paid by the trust for 
the	benefit	that	it	received	under	the	agreement	were	at	least	equal	
to the amount prescribed in Notice 2002-8, 2002-1 CB 398, the 
premium payments made by the taxpayers did not result in gifts 
to the trust. Because the taxpayers did not retain any incidents of 
ownership in the policies under the agreement, the proceeds of the 
policies payable to the trust were not includible in the gross estate 
of the taxpayers under I.R.C. § 2042(2). However, the portion of 
the proceeds payable to the survivor’s estate was includible under 
I.R.C. § 2042(1). Ltr. Rul. 200910002, Sept. 30, 2008.
 FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION
 ALIMONY. The taxpayer was divorced and part of the divorce 
judgment was a provision placing some of the taxpayer’s property 
in a trust for the former spouse as a guarantee of medical expenses, 
child support, alimony and legal expenses to be paid by the taxpayer. 
The spouse had the right to sell trust property to cover unpaid 
amounts.  The taxpayer did not make alimony and child support 
payments and the property in the trust was sold to pay the amounts 
owed. The taxpayer continued to fail to pay the child support and 
alimony but claimed deductions for alimony in two tax years. 
A state court entered a judgment for the unpaid amounts but the 
judgment was not paid. The court held that the taxpayer was not 
entitled to any alimony deduction for the two tax years because 
no alimony was actually paid in those years. Jonas v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2009-49.
 BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
denied a rehearing in the following case.  The taxpayer was 
employed full time as a college physics professor. The taxpayer 
claimed to have operated several businesses out of the taxpayer’s 
home	during	the	tax	years	in	question	and	filed	Schedule	C	for	
each business, but included no income for the businesses, with 
business expense deductions claimed. The taxpayer provided 
little written evidence to support the existence of the businesses 
and the court held that the taxpayer was not allowed deductions 
beyond those allowed by the IRS for lack of substantiation. The 
appellate	court	affirmed		per curiam in a decision designated as 
not for publication.  Kanofsky v. Comm’r, 2008-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,260 (3d Cir. 2008), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2006-79.
 CASUALTY LOSSES. The taxpayers were individuals who 
suffered loss of their residences in Gulf Coast hurricanes. Under 
FEMA’s Alternative Housing Pilot Program, the taxpayers 
received a replacement residence. The IRS ruled that the value 
of the replacement residence must be used to offset the amount 
of deductible casualty loss for the original residence. The IRS 
also ruled that, if the taxpayers had already claimed a casualty 
loss deduction in a prior tax year, the value of the replacement 
residence was taxable income in the year received, although the 
taxpayers	 could	file	 amended	 returns	 and	 reduce	 the	 casualty	
loss deduction in the year claimed. If such an amended return 
was	filed,	the	replacement	residence	was	not	income	in	the	year	
received. Ltr. Rul. 200910029, Feb. 2, 2009.
 COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
had brought a successful employer-retaliation claim against an 
employer under the California Fair Employment and Housing 
Act. The judgment awarded statutory attorney fees to the 
taxpayer’s attorney which the taxpayer did not include in taxable 
income. The court held that the taxpayer had either a (1) de facto 
contingency fee arrangement with the attorney or (2) an state-
required duty to pay the attorney for legal service; therefore, the 
statutory legal fees paid to the attorney were paid in satisfaction 
of the taxpayer’s obligation to pay the attorney and were taxable 
income. Green v. Comm’r, 2009-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
50,245 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2007-39.
 DEPENDENTS. The taxpayer was the maternal grandparent 
of a minor child of the taxpayer’s daughter. Under agreements 
with the daughter, the child’s paternal grandparents and the 
child’s father, the taxpayer had no custody or visitation rights as 
to the child. The taxpayer claimed dependent deductions, head 
of	household	filing	status,	child	 tax	credit	and	earned	 income	
tax credit on the basis of the child’s dependency. The taxpayer 
offered evidence of payment of amounts for the child’s support 
but did not provide credible evidence as to the amount of those 
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payments, the support provided by others, the living arrangements 
of the child or any dependent deduction waiver agreement entered 
into by the other parties. The court held that the taxpayer could 
not	claim	any	dependent	deductions,	head	of	household	filing	
status, child tax credit or earned income tax credit on the basis 
of the child’s dependency.  Horsley v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2009-47.
 DEPRECIATION. The taxpayer was engaged in the 
development of biofuels derived from domestically abundant, 
low-cost cellulosic biomass feedstocks and was in the business 
of commercializing the production of cellulosic ethanol using 
exclusive proprietary technology. The taxpayer used the accrual 
method	of	accounting	and	files	its	federal	income	tax	returns	on	a	
calendar year basis.  The taxpayer was in the process of designing 
and building a demonstration plant that will, if successful, allow 
the commercial production of ethanol. The demonstration plant 
would not itself produce ethanol but processed biomass  into a 
product that could be used to produce ethanol through another 
process. The ethanol produced by the demonstration plant 
is expected to be sold at market prices to unrelated gasoline 
blenders. The demonstration plant has entered the start-up 
phase.	The	 IRS	 ruled	 that	 the	 plant	was	 qualified	 cellulosic	
biomass	ethanol	plant	property	eligible	for	additional	first-year	
depreciation deduction under I.R.C. § 168(l). The IRS stated 
that	 the	absence	of	a	final	processing	of	 the	resulting	product	
by fermentation into ethanol was not required to qualify for the 
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 200910007, Dec. 2, 2008.
 DISASTER LOSSES.  On February 5, 2009, the president 
determined that certain areas in Kentucky are eligible for 
assistance from the government under the Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121) as a result of a 
severe	winter	storm	and	flooding,	which	began	on	January	26,	
2009. FEMA-1818-DR. On February 6, 2009, the president 
determined that certain areas in Arkansas are eligible for assistance 
from the government under the Act as a result of a severe winter 
storm, which began on January 26, 2009. FEMA-1819-DR. On 
February 15, 2009, the president determined that certain areas 
in Oklahoma are eligible for assistance from the government 
under the Act as a result of a severe storms and tornadoes, which 
began on February 10, 2009. FEMA-1820-DR.  On February 17, 
2009, the president determined that certain areas in Tennessee 
are eligible for assistance from the government under the Act as 
a	result	of	a	severe	winter	storm	and	flooding,	which	began	on	
January 27, 2009. FEMA-1821-DR. On February 17, 2009, the 
president determined that certain areas in Missouri are eligible 
for assistance from the government under the Act as a result of a 
severe winter storm, which began on January 26, 2009. FEMA-
1822-DR.  On February 17, 2009, the president determined that 
certain areas in Oklahoma are eligible for assistance from the 
government under the Act as a result of a severe winter storm 
and	flooding,	which	began	on	January	26,	2009. FEMA-1823-
DR. Accordingly, taxpayers in the may deduct the losses on their 
2008 federal income tax returns. See I.R.C. § 165(i).
 DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DEDUCTION. The taxpayer 
cooperative issued advance monthly checks to member producers 
based on commodities delivered to the cooperative for marketing 
in the previous month. The advance payments were considered 
advances on the net proceeds and treated as “per-unit retains paid in 
money.”	For	purposes	of	its	I.R.C.	§	199	computation	for	its	fiscal	
year, the cooperative intended to disregard the checks, as well as 
patronage dividends, and it planned to pass through to its members 
all or a portion of the I.R.C. § 199 deduction. The cooperative’s 
checks	qualified	as	per-unit	retain	allocations	within	the	meaning	
of I.R.C. § 1388(f) because they were distributed with respect to 
commodities that the cooperative marketed for its patrons, and 
by the fact that the patrons received the payments based on the 
quantity of the commodities delivered. In addition, the checks were 
determined without reference to the cooperative’s net earnings; the 
checks were paid pursuant to a contract with the patrons establishing 
the necessary pre-existing agreement and obligation; and the checks 
were paid within the payment period of I.R.C. § 1382(d). The IRS 
rule that: (1) The checks that the cooperative paid to its members and 
each year for commodities delivered to the cooperative constituted 
“per-unit retain allocations paid in money” within the meaning of 
I.R.C. § 1382(b)(3) and (2) in computing the cooperative’s section 
199 domestic production activities deduction, the cooperative’s 
qualified	production	activities	income	and	taxable	income	should,	
pursuant to I.R.C. § 199(d)(3)(C), be computed without regard to 
any deduction for the checks. Ltr. Rul. 200909016, Nov. 24, 2008; 
Ltr. Rul. 200909020, Nov. 24, 2008.
 INNOCENT SPOUSE. The taxpayer, a widow, sought equitable 
innocent	spouse	relief	from	taxes	unpaid	on	joint	tax	returns	filed	
with the decedent spouse. The taxpayer provided evidence that 
the couple’s affairs were controlled by the decedent who failed to 
disclose the decedent’s failure to pay taxes and other debts. The 
taxpayer also provided evidence that the decedent’s estate claims 
left the taxpayer without any property and forced to live on social 
security	 benefits.	The	 court	 held	 that	 equitable	 relief	 should	be	
granted to the taxpayer under the safe harbor provided in Rev. 
Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296 because (1) the taxpayer was no 
longer	married	to	the	decedent;	(2)	on	the	dates	of	the	filing	of	the	
returns, the taxpayer had no knowledge or reason to know that the 
decedent would not pay the taxes; and (3) the taxpayer would suffer 
economic hardship. Sunleaf v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-52.
 After the taxpayer’s spouse suffered a stroke, the spouse 
transferred an interest in a partnership to the taxpayer. An audit 
of the partnership later determined that losses claimed by the 
partnership were disallowed, resulting in capital gains tax liability to 
the partners, including the taxpayer. The taxpayer sought equitable 
innocent spouse relief from the taxes, claiming that the taxpayer 
did not have assets to pay the taxes. The court held that equitable 
innocent spouse relief could not be granted because, as the owner 
of the partnership interest, the taxes were attributable to the income 
of the taxpayer. Gronbeck v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-53.
 INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that, for the period 
April 1, 2009 through June 30, 2009, the interest rate paid on tax 
overpayments decreases to 4 percent (3 percent in the case of a 
corporation) and for underpayments decreases to 4 percent. The 
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interest rate for underpayments by large corporations decreases 
to 6 percent. The overpayment rate for the portion of a corporate 
overpayment exceeding $10,000 decreases to 1.5 percent. Rev. 
Rul. 2009-7, I.R.B. 2009-13. 
 PARTNERSHIPS
 ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENT. The IRS had filed 
a	 notice	 of	 final	 partnership	 administrative	 adjustment	more	
than	 three	 	years	and	 less	 than	six	years	after	 the	filing	of	 the	
partnership tax return. The court held that the I.R.C. § 6229(c)(1) 
six-year period of limitations on assessments applied because the 
partnership promoter prepared the partnership tax returns with 
the intent to evade taxes over a prolonged period. The court held 
that	the	intent	of	the	individual	partners	in	filing	their	individual	
tax returns was not relevant to the issue. River City Ranches v. 
Comm’r, 2009-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,257 (9th Cir. 2009), 
aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2007-171.
 PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The taxpayer was employed 
as a commissioned salesperson for a trailer dealership. The 
taxpayer invested in race horses. The horses were maintained by 
a horse trainer who did all of the work of training, hauling and 
racing the horses. The taxpayer had no experience with race horses 
and deferred most decisions to the trainer. The taxpayer had three 
years of tax losses from the race horse activity which offset the 
income from the sales employment. The IRS disallowed the losses 
as passive activity losses because the taxpayer did not materially 
participate in the horse racing activity. The taxpayer argued that 
the taxpayer participated in the activity more than 500 hours per 
year; therefore, the taxpayer was eligible for the Temp. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.469-5T(a)(1) exception. The taxpayer failed to substantiate 
the time and activities spent on the racing activity. The court 
noted that the taxpayer’s time spent in management could not be 
included because the taxpayer paid the trainer for management 
of the racing activity.  Schmuecker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary 
Op. 2009-32.
 The taxpayers, husband and wife, were employed as an engineer 
and a self-employed real estate agent, as part of a real estate 
brokerage business operated by a third party. The taxpayers 
owned two rental properties and devoted approximately 170 
hours per year in managing each property. The taxpayers claimed 
loss deductions for the rental properties in two tax years and the 
deductions were disallowed as passive activity losses by the 
IRS.  The taxpayers argued that the wife, as a real estate agent, 
was eligible for the real estate business exception in I.R.C. § 
469(c)(7)(B). The court examined state law to determine whether 
the wife was deemed to be in the real estate brokerage business 
and held that the wife performed the usual activities of a real estate 
broker in soliciting listings and the buying, selling and renting of 
real	estate.	Therefore,	the	court	held	that	the	wife	qualified	for	the	
exception and could claim the losses as a deduction. Agarwal v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2009-29.
 PENSION PLANS. The taxpayer terminated employment in 
November	 2004	 and	 requested	 a	 distribution	 from	a	 qualified	
pension plan in December 2004, expecting the distribution to 
occur in 2005; however, the distribution actually occurred in 
December 2004. The taxpayer did not include the distribution in 
income or pay the 10 percent penalty for early withdrawal. The 
taxpayer argued that the distribution was intended for 2005 but 
the court held that the distribution was taxable income for 2004, 
the taxable year in which it was received. The taxpayer did not 
claim any of the stated exceptions to the 10 percent penalty for 
early withdrawals but argued that the pension fund was taxable on 
the early distribution. The court held that the taxpayer was liable 
for the 10 percent penalty because no exceptions  were claimed 
or proved. Thompson v. Comm’r, 2009-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 50,260 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2007-327.
 For plans beginning in March 2009 for purposes of determining 
the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7), the 30-year 
Treasury securities annual interest rate for this period is 3.59 
percent, the corporate bond weighted average is 6.35 percent, and 
the 90 percent to 100 percent permissible range is 5.72 percent to 
6.35 percent. Notice 2009-20, I.R.B. 2009-12.
 REFUND.	The	 taxpayer	 filed	 a	 2001	 income	 tax	 return	 in	
August 2006, reporting self-employment income and earned 
income	credit,	resulting	in	a	refund	claim.	The	taxpayer	also	filed	
the 2002 income tax return in August 2002, claiming no taxable 
income and a refund from the earned income credit. No extensions 
were obtained for either year. The IRS denied the refund claims as 
untimely	because	they	were	filed	more	than	three	years	after	the	
original taxes were paid. The court held that the earned income 
credit was deemed paid on April 15 of the year following the tax 
year involved. Therefore, because August 2006 was more than 
three years after the earned income credit was deemed paid, the 
August 2006 returns were untimely refund claims.  Hof v. United 
States, 2009-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,259 (D. S.D. 2009).
 The taxpayer corporation had an overpayment of income 
taxes and had elected to credit the overpayment against the next 
year’s income taxes. The taxpayer sought consent to revoke the 
election and receive a refund. In a Chief Counsel advice letter, 
the	IRS	stated	that	I.R.C.	§	6513(d)	specifically	provides	that	if	
any overpayment of income tax is claimed as a credit against 
estimated tax for the succeeding taxable year, such amount shall 
be considered as a payment of the income tax for the succeeding 
taxable year (whether or not claimed as a credit on the return 
of estimated tax for such succeeding taxable year) and no 
claim for credit or refund shall be allowed for the taxable year 
in which the overpayment arises. The IRS has issued several 
administrative rulings that conclude that a taxpayer’s election to 
credit an overpayment of income tax against the estimated tax 
for the succeeding taxable year is binding and irrevocable. Under 
GCM 34620, the Commissioner “may allow amended elections 
in appropriate cases” only as to individual taxpayers. The GCM 
added that “the exclusion of corporations by the proposed policy 
statement	is	a	reasonable	classification.”	After	this	GCM,	the	IRS	
issued Policy Statement P-2-88 which provided that a taxpayer 
who wishes to change such an election in order to have the 
overpayment refunded may do so “only upon showing that the 
taxpayer	would	suffer	undue	financial	hardship”	again	limiting	
the policy to individual taxpayers.” In addition, IRM 20.2.4.8.4 
provided that if “a taxpayer requests permission to change a 
credit election to a refund, interest is not allowed on the refund. 
See Policy Statement P-2-88 for the circumstances in which the 
credit election can be reversed.” The IRS stated that there is no 
authority	that	extends	the	financial	hardship	exception	in	Policy	
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Statement P-2-88 to corporate taxpayers. The IRS held that, since 
the corporate taxpayer reported an income tax overpayment and 
elected to credit this overpayment to the following taxable year, 
the taxpayer cannot reverse the election and request a refund for 
the overpayment in the prior taxable year, even where the taxpayer 
showed	undue	financial	hardship.		CCA Ltr. Rul. 200909042, 
Nov. 19, 2008.
 SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. In a Chief Counsel advice 
letter, the IRS ruled that it  can reach all of the taxpayer’s social 
security	benefits	with	a	single	levy	under	I.R.C.	§		6331(a)	subject	
to the minimum exemption provision of I.R.C. § 6334(a)(9). The 
IRS stated that a single levy on the Social Security Administration 
attaches the right to receive the taxpayer’s future payments. The 
IRS further stated that, although I.R.C. § 6331(h) provides for the 
continuous	levy	of	social	security	benefits,	the	IRS	may	continue	
to levy under I.R.C. § 6331(a). The IRS stated that I.R.C. § 
6331(h) is meant to be an additional tool to supplement the other 
levy options, it was not meant to cut back the IRS’s methods by 
which it levies. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200909037, Sept. 4, 2008.
 SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES. The taxpayer operated 
accredited medical residency programs in conjunction with a state 
university for new doctors who have completed their medical 
education.  The taxpayer withheld and paid FICA taxes on the 
amounts	paid	to	the	medical	residents	and	filed	for	a	refund	of	
those	payments,	arguing	that	the	medical	residents	qualified	for	
the student exception under I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10). The IRS sought 
a summary judgment based on the argument that medical residents 
did not qualify for the student exception. The trial court held 
that the medical residents were not students and granted the IRS 
motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the appellate court 
held that, as a matter of law, the hospital was not precluded from 
the student exception and substantial fact issues remained which 
prevent summary judgment.  United States v. Detroit Medical 
Center, 2009-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,249 (6th Cir. 2009), 
rev’g and rem’g, 2006-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,618 (E.D. 
Mich. 2006).
 In a Chief Counsel advice letter, the IRS ruled that the non-wage 
amounts paid to the Peace Corps volunteers would not be subject 
to either FICA or SECA. The IRS ruled that I.R.C. § 1402(c)(2) 
precludes application of self-employment tax to any amounts 
paid to Peace Corps volunteers by virtue of the fact that I.R.C. 
§	3121(p)	defines	“employment”	to	include	services	performed	
by Peace Corps volunteers and therefore, these workers are 
employees. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200909045, Dec. 3, 2008.
 TAX COLLECTION. The IRS has announced that it will 
not renew its contracts with two private debt collection agencies 
whose current contracts expire March 6. Collection activities 
will be performed solely by IRS employees. The Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, Div. D, Sec. 106, 
specifies	that	the	Internal	Revenue	Service	“.	.	.	may	not	use	funds	
to enter into, renew, extend, administer, implement, enforce, or 
provide	oversight	of	any	qualified	tax	collection	contract.	.	.	.	“	
IR-2009-19.
 TAX SHELTERS. The taxpayer invested in a sham cattle 
partnership, the infamous Hoyt cattle partnerships, and claimed 
deductions in 1994 and 1995 for depreciation on the cattle 
purported to have been purchased through the taxpayer’s 
investment in the partnership. The taxpayer conceded to the IRS 
that the deductions were improper and agreed to interest and 
negligence penalties. The IRS also assessed penalties under I.R.C. 
§ 6662(h) for gross valuation misstatements on the tax returns. The 
taxpayer argued that the underpayment of taxes was attributable to 
the improper deductions and not to any undervaluation of assets. 
The IRS argued that the deductions were based on income tax basis 
in the cattle which far exceeded the taxpayer’s investment in the 
cattle, resulting in a valuation misstatement. The court held that, 
under Gainer v. Comm’r, 893 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1990), a valuation 
misstatement used to claim a deduction does not give rise to the 
misstatement penalty where the entire deduction is improper in 
the	first	place.	Thus,	in	this	case,	the	taxes	owed	resulted	from	
disallowance of the entire deduction because of the tax scam 
aspects of the investment and did not result from the misstatement 
of the value of the cattle. The court held that the gross misstatement 
valuation penalty was improperly assessed. Keller v. Comm’r, 
2009-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,246 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’g in 
part and rev’g in part, T.C. Memo. 2006-31.
PROPERTY
 EASEMENT.  The plaintiff possessed an easement for a farm 
lane over the defendant’s property for access to the plaintiff’s 
property. The plaintiff did not use the plaintiff’s property as a 
residence and did not present evidence of how often the plaintiff 
visited the property. The defendant placed a gate with a lock 
at the entrance to the lane to prevent dumping and trespassing 
and attempted to give the plaintiff a key to the lock, which the 
plaintiff refused. The plaintiff provided no reason for refusing 
the key and provided no evidence of any undue burden from the 
use of the lock and gate. The court held that the defendant acted 
reasonably in erecting the gate and the gate could remain so long 
as the defendant properly maintained the gate and provided the 
plaintiff with a key to the lock.  Hammond v. Lovvorn, 2009 
Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 45 (Ala. Ct. of App. 2009).
STATE TAXATION
 AGRICULTURAL USE.  The taxpayer’s property consisted of 
two units separated by a highway. The one unit was used for farming 
purposes and was valued under an agricultural use assessment. The 
other unit was used as a residence and for recreational uses. The 
taxpayer argued that the two properties should be treated as a single 
unit for tax assessment purposes and receive the agricultural use 
assessment for the entire property. The court held that the county 
tax commission properly treated the residence as a separate unit 
because it did not provide any storage, staging or production to 
support the agricultural activity on the other unit. The court also 
held that the disallowance of an agricultural use assessment for 
the residence unit was proper because the taxpayer did not use the 
unit for agricultural production.  Marsh v. Tax Commission of 
Box Elder County, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 41 (Utah Ct. App. 
2009).
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Special 20th Anniversary Sale
The Agricultural Law Press celebrates its 20 years of publishing in agricultural law with a series of special 
sales of its publications over the next few months.
During March & April 2009, purchase the Agricultural Law Manual for only $100 
postpaid (regularly $115) and receive your first update (July 2009) free.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by  Neil E. Harl
 The Agricultural Law Press presents a special sale on our  comprehensive looseleaf manual which is an ideal deskbook for attorneys, 
tax consultants and other professionals who advise agricultural clients and who need an economical and comprehensive resource for 
agricultural law issues.  Updates are published about every four months to keep the Manual current with the latest developments.  The 
book contains more than 900 pages plus an index. The Manual is also available on CD-ROM.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1:  Farm and Ranch Liability Chapter 10:  Governmental Regulation of Crop
Chapter 2:  Environmental Law Relating to Farms and Ranches  Production, Shipment and Sale
Chapter 3:  Agricultural Labor Chapter 11:  Government Regulation of Agricultural
Chapter 4:  Income Tax and Social Security  Inputs
Chapter 5:  Estate Planning: Death-Time Transfers Chapter 12:  Government Regulation of Foreign Trade
Chapter 6:  Gifts and Federal Gift Tax, Installment Sales  and Private Annuities
Chapter 7:  Organizing the Farm or Ranch Business Chapter 13:  Commercial Law Applicable to Farms and 
Chapter 8:  Life Estates and Trusts   Ranches
Chapter 9: Governmental Regulation of Animal Chapter 14:  Agricultural Cooperatives
 Production, Shipment and Sale
 The Agricultural Law Manual is especially strong in the areas of federal income, estate and gift taxation affecting farm and ranch 
businesses, and federal Chapter 12 farm bankruptcy law. The Manual contains discussions of all areas covered in Dr. Harl’s farm tax 
seminars and more.  Discussions are cross referenced to the 14 volume treatise, Agricultural Law by Dr. Neil E. Harl.  A comprehensive 
index facilitates research.
The Author:
 Neil E. Harl is one of the country’s foremost authorities on agricultural law. Dr. Harl is a member of the Iowa Bar, Charles F. Curtiss 
Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and Emeritus Professor of Economics at Iowa State University, and author of the 14 volume 
treatise, Agricultural Law, the one volume Agricultural Law Manual, the Farm Income Tax Manual, and numerous articles on agricultural 
law and economics.
Purchase Offer
 To purchase your copy at this special price, send $100 by check to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 835, Brownsville, OR 97327. 
The Manual may also be ordered online, www.agrilawpress.com, using your credit card through the PayPal secure online system. Be 
sure to use the “multiple publication” price of $100. The book will include the July 2009 update free of charge. Subsequent semi-annual 
updates are available for $100 per year (three updates).
